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COMMENTARY
A VIABLE COMPROMISE ON MINORITY ADMISSIONS
NATHAN GLAZER*
Dean Griswold has given us a wise and balanced analysis of the
problem raised by the Bakke case.' He has told us Justice Powell's
compromise is probably the best solution at the moment to the problem
posed by the fact that colorblind or group-blind admissions procedures
will not now lead to the admission to law and medical schools of sub-
stantial numbers of applicants from the black and some Hispanic
American groups. Dean Griswold has warned us that there are many
dangers and perplexities in the Powell compromise, and that we cannot
hope to avoid these, both in the case of law school and medical school
admissions and in similar cases in the fields of employment or regula-
tion. I share both his agreement with the result and his fears for the
future.
In my remarks, I will take up the license suggested at the beginning
and at the end of his paper where he tells us that what we deal with in
the Bakke case are not constitutional and legal problems alone, but
social and philosophical-and, I would add, political-problems. I will
argue that from these points of view, the Powell compromise is one we
should all embrace for a range of reasons, few of which will have much
merit to constitutional lawyers, but all of which are of weight if we are
to overcome the dangers of resentful minorities and intergroup conflicts
that the Bakke issue raises.
I want to broaden the discussion beyond the narrow and complex
matter of the Supreme Court's judgment, teetering as it does on a ra-
zor's edge-a judgment that may be shifted one way or another by the
next case-to ask: what is best for us as a nation? How do men of good
will, concerned for the joint objectives of justice for minorities and har-
mony among the varied racial and ethnic elements of the nation, now
* Professor of Sociology, Harvard University; Editor, The Public Interest. B.S.S., 1944,
College of the City of New York; M.A., 1944, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., 1962, Columbia
C niversity.
1. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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proceed? I think we have concentrated for too long on the judicial and
constitutional means of deciding complicated issues. We are, it is true,
in the end governed by what the Supreme Court asserts is constitu-
tional. But in this complex area, I believe that if the varied groups and
interests that have held different positions in the Bakke and related
conflicts could agree on the general principles of a course of action,
then that course of action would be the one that legislatures, regulatory
bodies, and courts would on the whole accept. On this issue the courts
have not been uniform or overreaching. As the Bakke decision shows,
the Supreme Court does not think that the Constitution or the laws give
unambiguous guidance. It is an incredible situation-but one we will
have to live with-when four justices disagree sharply with four other
justices as to the meaning of legislation passed only fourteen years
ago-the Civil Rights Act 2 -at a time when most of those who passed
it are still alive and many still sit in the same Congress and can be
asked what they meant. Under these circumstances the Court may well
be guided by dominant public opinion as to the practices that conform
to a common vision of a just and harmonious society.
I have coupled these two criteria-justice and harmony-and I will
explain why. In the present context of discussion of public issues, it is
not necessary to explain why we want a just society, which in present
understanding generally means a more equal one, but it is necessary to
say a word about why multi-ethnic harmony is also an objective to be
pursued. One can, of course, envisage situations in which justice calls
for fierce intergroup conflict. We might agree that this was the case
when the nation imposed desegregation on the South. Some of us
might disagree that this was the case when federal courts imposed bus-
ing on some Northern cities. But in general, after the claims of justice
are met, we want ethnic and racial groups to live together in harmony.
No one wants a society in which one group or another feels alienated
and does not effectively engage in its decisionmaking processes or ac-
cept the generally agreed procedures for making decisions on disputed
issues. In this sense, the two objectives, which sometimes may be in
conflict-justice, forcing us to forego harmony, and harmony, forcing
us to give up the full measure of justice some of us may feel neces-
sary-are jointly necessary for forging a viable policy.
The problem is that our varying conceptions of what is justice in the
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (1976)).
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case of preferential policies have been so at odds. Justice, in my view
and in the views of many people, demands that the individual alone be
the test for admissions and employment. On the other hand, we know
that there are many others-and they represent the great majority of
the leadership of the major civil rights groups-who believe that jus-
tice, in more and more circumstances, does demand numerical objec-
tives-call them quotas or goals (I think the difference does not amount
to much)-for which our judgment of the individual must give way
before the question of to which group that individual belongs. Here
are two conceptions of justice in conflict. If one or the other prevails,
great bodies of our citizenry will be deeply offended and angered, and
will simply see this as an unjust society-one that either refuses to
make up for discrimination and prejudice against the black, or one that
ignores the rights of the individual and denies Marco DeFunis and Al-
lan Bakke the objectives for which they individually struggled. It is
under these circumstances that the second criterion that I would use to
judge a decent policy-one that permits a substantial degree of interra-
cial and interethnic harmony to prevail-comes into play. Is there a
policy that satisfies these objectives? I think there is, and I think that
Justice Powell has begun to point the way to it. In a word, it is that race
and ethnicity may be a factor, but cannot be the factor in the key deci-
sion to admit to specialized and over-applied-for programs. Having
long argued for a society that bases key decisions on individual rather
than racial and ethnic characteristics, why would I now argue for this
breach in the principle to allow some consideration of race and ethnici-
ty, if it does not become the decisive factor?
Let me make a preliminary point. While I believe Justice Powell's
compromise-some account of race, but not race as the decisive fac-
tor-is, for reasons I will develop, one that both sides might accept, I
do not think his reasoning in getting to this position is very persuasive.
He gets there for one reason: that diversity in student bodies, which
race may in part provide, is a legitimate academic objective. Well and
good. I do not think many would disagree. I can easily see those who
oppose quotas and goals nevertheless tempted to take people whose
background suggests that they have had different and interesting exper-
iences, which is almost always true of blacks. Nevertheless, as we all
know, we have instituted quota-like procedures in our law and medical
schools for other reasons, too, and I think we would have to accept that
taking race into account as one factor in making decisions could be
justified on these grounds as well. Some grounds I would exclude. For
Number 11
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example, I would not accept as a legitimate reason for taking race into
account the bowing to pressure of organized students or faculty; that is,
to force. Nor would I accept as a legitimate ground for taking race into
account the argument that certain races and ethnic groups must be rep-
resented in proportion to their population (or some other statistic) in
important occupations and roles. But I do think other arguments that
Justice Powell ruled out as a basis for taking race into account on con-
stitutional grounds hold up on other grounds-and perhaps on consti-
tutional grounds as well. Dean Griswold indicated a range of reasons
that might justify taking race into account. For example, if a school
were interested in doing more to serve a certain population, taking race
into account would not be unreasonable. True, the black medical stu-
dent might not serve a primarily black population, but insofar as he
had black patients one might hope for a larger measure of understand-
ing and empathy. It may well be the case that blacks do better as doc-
tors, all things considered, than their test scores suggest. (I speak of
blacks for convenience-they are by far the largest minority, and their
claims to special treatment are best grounded-but it should be under-
stood that when I say blacks I generally mean blacks and other minori-
ties who are favored in preferential programs.)
Justice Powell, limited by the Constitution as he understood it, could
accept only one narrow ground for taking race into account for admis-
sions. I, not being an expert on the Constitution, but only considering
what is a just and viable policy, can accept other reasons.
But now, why would someone who has strongly opposed quotas and
goals and the whole development of a statistical standard for group
justice imposed by governmental agencies accept the Powell
compromise?
First, there is a narrowly pragmatic ground: Next time those of us
who oppose quotas may lose completely. Four justices are willing to
accept quotas without any observable restrictions, as long as these quo-
tas are making up for past discrimination.3 Justice Powell does not
think the fourteenth amendment forbids taking some account of race.4
The other four justices did not get to the Constitution, but spoke only
of the Civil Rights Act,5 which is already interpreted by governmental
3. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
4. Id at 320.
5. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976), provides: "No person in the
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agencies (generally with the approval of federal courts) to require goals
and quotas.6 I think the next step in litigation-when one considers
that it is President Carter who will be making the next appointments to
the Supreme Court-may well fully legitimate quotas, thus establishing
as constitutional those practices that make race decisive rather than one
factor to be taken into account.
Second, there is a more substantive and troubling ground for ac-
cepting the "race as a factor" compromise: Most of us who defend in-
dividual rights already accept so many programs that do reach out to
and make special efforts to assist members of given racial and ethnic
groups. Dean Griswold has properly pointed out that many such pro-
grams now exist. There are various programs-usually operating with
some federal funds or with tax-exempt foundation and college
funds-that seek out blacks, Hispanic Americans, and American Indi-
ans for exclusive preparatory schools, colleges, and professional
schools. These programs make no bones that they are looking for peo-
ple of these groups, and will give them special assistance, tutorial or
financial, to get them into and through selective educational institu-
tions. Now that we accept these kinds of programs, where do we draw
the line? We could draw the line at assistance in meeting common and
universal standards, granting financial assistance and tutorial aid if
they get in by meeting these common standards. But do we really be-
lieve we can properly draw the line there? Is there so much difference
between a summer or two of intensive work for members of given eth-
nic groups to help them get into medical school, or intensive tutoring
once they are in, and an admissions decision that leans over backward
to make a concession in favor of members of that group? I cannot find
a decisive difference. A similar issue has come up when people favor-
ing quotas have argued, "We will let them in, but we will retain the
same standards for letting them out." In the first place, I would not
want to bend very far the standards for getting in. But in all honesty,
few of us who sit on the admissions committees or on appointment
committees have really applied a rigidly colorblind policy. We have
leaned over backwards for some applicants, some potential faculty
members. That makes us all lawbreakers if we were to apply strictly
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa-
Tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
i-ccciving Federal financial assistance."
6. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 341-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
-udgmcnt in part and dissenting in part).
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Title VI and the fourteenth amendment. But since we are all a little
guilty, can we now raise ourselves up in full righteous wrath and insist
that no account at all of race may be taken in admissions?
And a third substantial reason: We might all consider with some
trepidation what the reaction of blacks, or at least black civil rights
agencies and black officials in governmental agencies enforcing nondis-
crimination and affirmative action in education and employment,
would have been to the kind of decision that would have permitted no
account of race, and would have taken us back to the understanding of
nondiscrimination that was embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
At that time we all-black and white alike, civil rights organizations
and governmental agencies-had a common view of what the law said
and intended-that is, a colorblind society and colorblind action. I still
think that this would be the best society for us-as I will elaborate fur-
ther on-and I hope that we may yet reach that consummation for
which we still devoutly wish. But I wonder how many of us would
have looked with full equanimity and satisfaction on the reaction to a
decision that now said, "Yes, the fourteenth amendment demands strict
color blindness, and so, too, does the Civil Rights Act,8 and no account
at all may be taken of race or ethnic group by any institutions that
receive federal funds or that in any way are affected with a state inter-
est." One might have delighted in the fact that thousands of affirmative
action officers in the federal government, in private business, and in
colleges and universities suddenly would have found themselves at a
loss for work. And yet I am afraid at how such a decision might have
been interpreted. However strongly one feels about a principle, there
are times when one does not want too total a victory for it because one
feels that men of good will-somewhat misguided, it is true-will feel
deeply offended and alienated from their fellow Americans by such a
victory. I myself would be happier arguing before such a decision
came down that it would not mean that the United States has turned its
back on black fellow citizens and their need, hoping to convince fellow
citizens, rather than arguing after it came down that it did not mean
abandonment of blacks.
Let me present a parallel. The Supreme Court decisions on school
prayer and abortion deeply offended and angered great numbers of
Americans. Whether or not these decisions were wrong constitution-
7. See note 5 supra.
8. See note 2 supra.
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ally in overriding state and local options, they were unwise because
they alienated so many Americans from our processes of government
and brought the Supreme Court into disrepute. A strong decision
against quotas and goals would to my mind be right constitutionally.
Yet I would hope we could get there in stages and with a greater degree
of acquiescence from the minorities affected.
There is yet a fourth reason for the compromise: It defends the au-
tonomy of educational institutions and private employers. I believe
that they should have an independence of action to fulfill certain objec-
tives as they see fit. And I would like to see the restrictions imposed by
my understanding of our colorblind Constitution rest more lightly on
them than on government. I think that it would be wrong for govern-
ment to require academic institutions to take so many and so many of
such-and-such a racial and ethnic category, which fortunately it yet
does not, and that it is wrong to require contractors and employers to
hire or promote so many of this or that racial or ethnic category, which
unfortunately it does. But I would like to make a distinction between
what government-our government, operating under our Constitution
and our laws-should not do and what autonomous and independent
institutions may do. We should make a distinction between a college
and the government, or a business and the government. I could find
reasons for colleges to admit preferentially the children of alumni or a
few able athletes, or for business to hire people on the basis of a good
impression made on a boss or without requiring the applicant to take
the equivalent of a civil service examination. We expect government to
be more "just," to apply universal roles, to be blind to such things as
family connections or special attractiveness. One good reason we allow
more discretion in the nongovernmental organizations than in the gov-
ernmental is that they truly have different functions and objectives.
One objective of a private college is to raise enough funds to support
itself, and that may be a good enough reason to give preference to the
alumni's children. One objective of business is to make a profit by
means of entrepreneurial judgment, and that may be enough to justify
quirky hiring.
There is another important reason why we properly should bind gov-
ernment to strict universalistic standards. This is a multi-ethnic country
with a rich group life centered on religion, ethnicity, and race. We ex-
pect these varied groups to establish institutions that are in some sub-
stantial degree exempt from universalism in their practices, even
though we bar them from practicing a crude racism. Thus, we expect a
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Lutheran college to be attractive to Lutherans, and few of us would be
disturbed if it tried to seek out good Lutheran students. And this is not
only because we give special license to religion. Even if a college were
Norwegian Lutheran and tried to ensure a body of students of Norwe-
gian Lutheran background with an interest in that specific ethno-reli-
gious tradition, it would not bother us. We also are aware that much of
the small business of this country runs on family lines and, beyond
that, on ethnic lines. That an Italian restaurant prefers Italian employ-
ees would not be a cause of great concern, though our literal and nar-
row-minded bureaucrats often find that hard to accept. But while our
ethnic and religious subgroups properly maintain themselves through
associational and business ties, based in part on ethnicity and religion,
we want our government, standing above all groups and standing for
ideally blind justice, to be universalistic in its hiring and decisionmak-
ing practices.
Thus, government is properly bound to stricter standards. One prob-
lem in the present situation is that the line between government and
nongovernment is blurred. Government has so expanded its scope that
almost everything is considered bound by the same rules by which gov-
ernment should be bound. Thus, every college and university is now
considered a "government contractor," even though its only benefit
from the federal government is that its students, like all college stu-
dents, are eligible for federal grants and loans. Private schools are now
being brought under strict IRS scrutiny on how they fulfill an IRS-
imposed standard of affirmative action in admissions; if they do not
satisfy the IRS, they may lose their tax exemption as nonprofit schools.9
The Supreme Court looks upon the Medical School at Davis almost as
if it is a branch of government itself, because Davis receives federal aid.
I would like to see a looser standard for autonomous institutions of
higher education, whether "public" or "private," than I would expect
for government itself. I would want and expect different schools to take
on somewhat different missions-some to train practitioners, others to
train researchers; some to serve an area, others to serve the nation-
and in taking on these missions, there should be an acceptance of a
broad range of different actions in carrying them out. Of course, there
are limits. None of us would like to see discrimination against specified
groups. But in all honesty, I see a difference between discriminating
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 9451-55 (1979) (corrections noted at 44 Fed. Reg. 11021 (1979)) (proposed
revenue procedure on private tax-exempt schools).
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against Jews, which many medical schools used to do, and deciding
that a few more blacks in the school would be a good idea for a number
of reasons.
Because I believe in the autonomy of private associations, even when
they receive a modicum of governmental aid in the form of assistance
to students or tax exemption for purposes of receiving gifts, I would
like to see a greater degree of freedom for them than for government.
Thus, I would accept their right to make race a factor in such matters as
admission to educational programs and, by extension, to employment.
By the same token, I would continue to resist government when it im-
poses racial and ethnic quotas. That is not its job, and by doing so, it
gravely undercuts its position of standing above groups and being fair
to all. And being fair to all means being fair to individuals.
There is finally a fifth reason for accepting the Powell compromise:
Those of us who oppose quotas and goals could not, without a certain
danger of smugness, insist on absolute academic standards if that
meant that blacks, who compose eleven percent of our population, were
only one percent of our lawyers and doctors. I do not accept a statisti-
cal standard of justice. It is ridiculous, for example, to argue our judi-
cial system is unfair to blacks because more blacks are arrested and
sentenced. The argument must be couched in terms of whether they
are treated differently for the same offenses. Nevertheless, a very sub-
stantial disproportion in the numbers of doctors and lawyers, as well as
the number of prisoners, must be a cause of concern and is properly a
target of some kind of action. I would argue that the right way to in-
crease the number of black doctors and lawyers is to undertake concen-
trated compensatory educational programs so that a larger number of
blacks will score well enough on admissions tests to enter law and med-
ical school, and will score well enough on state bar and medical exami-
nations to become lawyers and doctors. And yet insofar as some
flexibility in admissions practices can help increase that number with-
out substantial danger to the quality of the professionals-or to their
perceived quality-then I would favor flexible discretion. But the
startling and enormous differences between the scores of those regu-
larly admitted and of those minorities admitted under the special pro-
gram at the Medical School of the University of California-Davis
showed that discretion can be grossly abused. One wonders whether
Bakke would have won if the difference between his scores and those of
the special admittees were of the order of magnitude of ten to twenty
percentile points rather than fifty to sixty. And I wonder indeed
Number 1]
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whether under those circumstances he should have been admitted (or
would have brought his case). Some flexibility, yes; quotas and gross
abuse of the flexibility, no. If we want autonomy for our educational
institutions, if we want them to pursue distinctive and self-chosen
objectives, then we must accept this flexibility.
But how do we prevent the use of "race as a factor," now accepted by
the Supreme Court for educational institutions (and very likely to be
accepted, on other grounds, for employment) from simply turning co-
vertly into quotas? And how do we prevent this if we at the same time
want to respect the autonomy of educational institutions? Undoubt-
edly, this will be no simple matter. The problems of defining how race
may be a factor without turning it into the forbidden quota will raise
many difficulties. Undoubtedly, there will be more litigation. And yet
I feel the principle is so well taken, for the reasons I have given above.
that we should accept the difficulties of trying to find a line that most
people can understand, and should observe some flexibility in admis-
sions taking account of race without allowing it to turn into a quota or
into a practice grossly unfair to others.
There can be standards that show whether a quota is operating.
Thus, if the number of blacks admitted stays remarkably similar year
after year, despite changes in the applicant pool and in average scores,
there certainly will be grounds for suspicion, and courts may act on
such evidence, and admissions committees may avoid covert quotas
knowing that. If the academic differences between majority and minor-
ity applicants are as huge as they were in the Davis case, there certainly
will be grounds for suspicion-just as in the reverse case in which Jew-
ish quotas in medical schools were demonstrated by the regular denial
of admission to Jewish students with very high tested abilities and the
regular acceptance of non-Jewish students with much lower abilities.
We want flexibility and should bend over backwards, but not so far as
to throw the responsibility of admissions committees into question.
I think that, because of Bakke and provided that we can hold the line
against quotas, we are entering into a period when black doctors and
lawyers will be more respected. Black doctors and lawyers who will be
graduating in 1982 and beyond, I am sure, will be looked upon as more
capable than those who graduated between the early 1970's and early
1980's when crude quotas were in operation in so many schools. They
may even be considered as good as the black graduates of the period
before the early 1970's when, whether or not blacks still had to face
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discrimination, they were undoubtedly admitted according to the same
i-'dards used to admit others.
NVe now read that the number of black law and medical students is
bheginning to decline after almost a decade of rapid growth. Blacks ac-
counted for 6.7% of first-year medical students in 1977, compared with
7 5% in 1974. They accounted for 4.9% of first-year law school students
in 1977, compared with a peak of 5.3% in 1976. Observers cite two
reasons for this decline. First, more blacks are entering engineering
and business. Second, the Bakke case has had a chilling effect. I would
argue that both of these reasons are excellent ones for this modest de-
dine. If blacks are diversifying their educational goals and moving
into areas they never considered before, that is fine. If they feel engi-
neering and business are less demanding or more rewarding than law
and medicine, that is their decision, and in a free society there is no
reason why we should want to interfere in it. And if the Bakke case
has suggested to many that their mathematics and science skills must
be stronger to justify their admission to medical school, there is nothing
wrong with that. Only if students who strongly desire to be lawyers
and doctors, and who have the ability to keep up with their classmates
and to make able professionals, are being dissuaded from applying,
should we be concerned. I hope that is not happening, and I have seen
ao evidence that it is.
There is a final safeguard to the return of quota systems; that is, to
keep government from requiring or imposing quotas. We have been
fortunate that government has not imposed racial and ethnic quotas on
institutions of higher education, except in the special case of histori-
cally black and white colleges and universities in the South. That is all
jo the good. Unfortunately, government is very active in the business
of imposing quotas and goals on employers. We may hope that deter-
mined litigation and corrective action in Congress to reemphasize the
antidiscrimination legislation it adopted in 196410 may drive govern-
nient from that field. But if, when government is driven from the field
of imposing quotas, individual institutions of education or individual
businesses want to do more than strict nondiscrimination and color
blindness would require, we should respect their right to do so. Some
groups, principally blacks, have suffered severely from prejudice and
discrimination. Nondiscrimination will do a certain amount to change
their position. Special compensatory programs should do more. But
10 See nole 5 supra.
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this is a country of many groups and religions, and action by members
of one group to aid its own, or of many groups to aid one that has been
especially victimized, is to be expected and must not be forbidden in a
society in which there are generous as well as ungenerous instincts.
Whether that will lead to a society in which there are five, or ten, or
fifteen percent black doctors and lawyers, I do not know. For the next
generation, the lower figure is the more likely one. But that should be
of no concern to government so long as general fairness operates, dis-
crimination is banned, and flexibility of decisionmaking by private and
autonomous institutions is combined with a sense of responsibility to
their missions.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/12
